The Type 1 processing operates quickly, has a high capacity and is independent of working memory and cognitive ability. Many authors have postulated that decisional biases arise from a competition between two distinct types of reasoning, i.e., an intuitive-heuristic form of reasoning-Type 1, and an executive-analytic form of mental operations-Type 2 ( Sloman, 1996 De Neys, 2006 Evans, 2011 Kahneman, 2012). Classically, a framing effect occurs when participants make more risk-seeking choices when the outcome is formulated in terms of losses than when it is formulated in terms of gains ( Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). However, converging evidence demonstrates predictable shifts in preferences when a given problem is framed in different ways, i.e., the “framing effect” ( Tversky and Kahneman, 1981 De Martino et al., 2006 Cassotti et al., 2012). According to this principle, preferences among prospects should not be affected by variations in the irrelevant features of the options, such as how they are described. A well-known decisional bias is the violation of the description invariance principle ( Tversky and Kahneman, 1981 Kahneman and Frederick, 2007).
Intuition and emotions appear to play important roles in this process, sometimes leading to decisional errors ( Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001 Houdé and Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2003 Evans, 2008 Blanchette and Richards, 2010 Cassotti et al., 2012 De Neys and Bonnefon, 2013). These results confirm that emotions play a key role in framing susceptibility.ĭecision making under risk is based on an appraisal of different options offering various probabilities of winning and outcome values.
Fear increased risk-averse choices, whereas anger decreased risk-averse choices, leading to a suppression of the framing effect.
Risk-taking was modulated by emotional context: fear and anger influenced risk-taking specifically in the gain frame and had opposite effects. Finally, participants chose between a sure option and a gamble option of equally expected value in a gain or loss frame. In each trial, participants received an initial amount of money, and pictures of angry or fearful faces were presented to them. In this study, we examined whether specific incidental negative emotions (i.e., fear and anger) influence framing susceptibility and risk-taking identically. According to dual process theories, this bias could stem from an affective heuristic belonging to an intuitive type of reasoning. A classic example of the effect of emotion on decision making under risk is the “framing effect,” which involves predictable shifts in preferences when the same problem is formulated in different ways. Emotions strongly influence our decisions, particularly those made under risk.
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